股权激励强度谁主沉浮？——基于不同控制环境下的高管权力与能力视角被引量：9

What Determines the Intensity of Equity Incentive?From the Perspective of Executive Power and Ability under Different Control Environments

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摘要选取2007-2016年沪市A股与深市主板A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证分析高管权力、高管能力以及产权性质对企业股权激励强度在授予阶段和行权阶段等不同控制环境下的影响,结果表明:(1)在授予阶段,高管的权力越大,授予的股权激励强度越大,高管权力对股权激励授予强度的正向影响大于高管能力;相对于国有企业,非国有企业中高管权力越大其被授予的股权激励强度越大。(2)在行权阶段,高管能力越强,其越有可能达到行权所设定的业绩目标,解锁行权的股权激励强度越大,高管能力对股权激励解锁行权强度的正向影响大于高管权力;高管年薪对高管股权激励行权强度能够产生一定的“挤出”效应;在既定的股权激励业绩目标下,相对于非国有企业,国有企业中高管权力越大其行权的股权激励强度越大。 Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016 as research samples,this paper empirically analyzes the influence of executive power,executive ability and property right on the intensity of equity incentive in different control environments,such as in the course of authorization and in the course of exercise.It is found that:(1)In the course of authorization,the intensity of equity incentive increases as executive’s power grows.Executive’s power exerts a greater positive influence on the intensity than their ability.The same association is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises.(2)In the course of exercise,the stronger the executive's ability is,the more likely it is to achieve the performance goal set by the exercise,and the stronger the equity incentive to unlocking the exercise.Executive ability exerts a greater positive influence on the the equity incentive to unlocking the exercise than their power.The annual salary of executives can have a certain crowding-out effect on the intensity of equity incentive.In SOEs,a greater positive association is found between executive power and equity incentive intensity than in non-SOEs under the vested performance targets.

作者于谦龙孙蔚然何强 YU Qianlong;SUN Weiran;HE Qiang(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science&Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;Shandong Land Development Group Co.,Ltd.,Jinan 250000,China)

机构地区上海理工大学管理学院山东省土地发展集团有限公司

出处《南京审计大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第1期73-81,共9页 Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基金国家社会科学基金项目（17BJY214）

关键词高管权力高管能力股权激励强度产权性质国有企业盈余管理审计质量公司治理 executive power executive ability equity incentive intensity nature of property rights state-owned enterprises earnings management audit quality corporate governance

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介于谦龙(1977-),男,河南新野人,上海理工大学管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士,主要研究方向为公司财务管理,邮箱:yqlong0213@126.com;孙蔚然(1992-),女,山东济南人,山东省土地发展集团有限公司职员,硕士,主要研究方向为公司财务管理;何强(1975-),男,河南郑州人,上海理工大学管理学院讲师,硕士生导师,博士,主要研究方向为公司财务管理。