摘要
选取重污染行业央企上市公司为研究对象,通过手工整理其高管个人特征数据,实证检验高管政治晋升预期与环境信息披露质量的关系。研究发现:重污染行业央企董事长政治晋升预期与环境信息披露质量显著负相关,支持政治晋升预期“消极效应”假说,但总经理政治晋升预期对环境信息披露质量影响不显著,说明“一把手”现象在央企较为突出。而且,地方政府环境监管力度越强,重污染行业央企董事长政治晋升预期与环境信息披露质量的负相关性越显著,表明董事长在面临政治晋升机会时存在“风险规避”倾向;公司上市年限越长,董事长政治晋升预期对环境信息披露的负向影响越低,表明声誉“软约束”能发挥积极作用。
This paper empirically studied the relationship between executives’political promotion expectation and environmental information disclosure quality focusing on central SOEs in heavily-polluting industries,with hand-collected data of executives’personal characteristics.It was found that central SOEs’chairmen’s political promotion expectation was significantly negatively correlated with the quality of environmental information disclosure in heavily-polluting industries,supporting the“negative effect”hypothesis of political promotion expectation,but presidents’political promotion expectation had no significant impact on that,which indicates that the“first-in-command”phenomenon is prominent in central SOEs.Moreover,under the influence of local governments’environmental supervision,the negative relationship between chairmen’s political promotion expectation and environmental information disclosure quality is stronger,showing that chairmen have a tendency to“evade risks”when facing political promotion opportunities;while the listed age can inhibit the negative relationship,indicating that the“soft constraint”of reputation plays a positive role.
作者
李强
王圣营
LI Qiang;WANG Shengying(School of Management,China University of Mining&Technology,Xuzhou Jiangsu 221116,China)
出处
《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期22-30,共9页
Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“管理防御对企业选择性环境信息披露的影响及控制机制研究”(16BGL067)
关键词
政治晋升预期
环境信息披露
央企
重污染行业
political promotion expectation
environmental information disclosure
central SOEs
heavily-polluting industry
作者简介
李强(1980-),男,博士,教授,E-mail:kdliqiang@163.com。