摘要
本文从委托代理、高管薪酬契约有效性、信息不对称三个理论角度探讨公司高管薪酬激励对盈余管理水平的影响机理,并以2011—2017年创业板上市公司作为实证样本,考察高管薪酬与应计、真实盈余管理这两种行为的关系。结果显示,高管薪酬越高,其应计、真实盈余管理水平越低。进一步地,考虑高管持股的调节作用,研究发现高管持股弱化了高管薪酬的正向激励作用。并且,高管持股比例增加,对应计盈余管理行为的偏好要强于对真实盈余管理活动,这可能是高管考虑到后者对企业长期价值的损害较高。
This article discusses the influence mechanism of corporate executive compensation incentives on earnings management from three theoretical perspectives:principal-agent,executive contract effectiveness,and information asymmetry.Taking the GEM listed companies from 2011 to 2017 as empirical samples,this paper examines The relationship between executive compensation and accrual and true earnings management.The results show that the higher the executive compensation,the lower its accrual and true earnings management level.Further,considering the regulatory role of executive shareholding,the study found that executive shareholding weakened the positive incentive effect of executive compensation.In addition,the increase in the shareholding of executives has a stronger preference for earnings management behaviors than real earnings management activities.This may be due to the fact that the latter considers that the latter has a higher damage to the long-term value of the enterprise.
作者
朱芬芬
周宇倩
Zhu Fenfen;Zhou Yuqian(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,Jiangsu)
出处
《江苏商论》
2020年第1期114-117,共4页
Jiangsu Commercial Forum
关键词
高管薪酬
高管持股
应计盈余管理
真实盈余管理
executive compensation
executive holdings
accrued earnings management
true earnings management
作者简介
朱芬芬(1995—),女,江西,东南大学经济管理学院会计学硕士在读,初级会计师;周宇倩(1994—),女,江西,东南大学经济管理学院会计专业硕士在读,已获得ACCA证书。
