摘要
基于区域性巨灾应急救灾的特征,建立中央政府、地方政府、受灾群众的三方博弈模型。通过三方之间相互作用因素的分析,建立救灾成功的概率函数,得出救灾成功后以及救灾失败时的实际收益。通过三方救灾成功后的期望收益分析,建立参与者决策模型。分析结果表明,在中央政府、地方政府和受灾群众三者的期望救灾收益最大情况下,三方救灾投入成本存在均衡状态,并且可以求出最优的均衡解。
Based on the characteristics of emergency response and disaster relief for regional catastrophes,the three-party game model of central government,local government and disaster victims was set up.First,through the analysis of the interaction factors among the three parties,the probability function of disaster relief success was established,and the actual benefits of the success and failure of the disaster relief were obtained.Secondly,the participants'decision-making model was established through the analysis of the expected return after the success of the three-party disaster relief.The analysis results show that when the expected benefits of disaster relief of central government,local government and disaster victims were the largest,the input cost of three-party disaster relief was in equilibrium,and the optimal equilibrium solution could be obtained.
作者
马娜
MA Na(Gaomi Campus,Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Weifang 261500,China)
出处
《山东科学》
CAS
2019年第1期113-117,共5页
Shandong Science
基金
山东省中青年科学家科研奖励基金(BS2013SF014)
山东省自然科学基金(ZR2017PEM)
关键词
应急救灾
纳什均衡
期望收益
逆行归纳法
emergency response and disaster relief
Nash equilibrium
expected return
retrograde induction
作者简介
马娜(1984-),女,硕士,讲师,研究方向为数学问题计算机证明和应用博弈理论。E-mail:251504872@qq.com
