摘要
近年来关联担保现象日益频繁,关联担保作为一种融资机制在本质上是为了解决信贷的信息不对称问题。本文以我国深沪A股上市公司2007-2016年的数据为研究样本,分析公司接受关联担保对其债务融资成本的影响,并从信息风险、债务代理风险两个方面进行实证检验。研究发现接受关联担保能够降低公司债务融资成本,关联担保降低了公司的应计与真实盈余管理程度、提高了盈余质量;关联担保对债务融资成本的降低效应,在非四大事务所审计的市场化程度低的公司更加显著。以上结论表明关联担保可以通过降低企业信息风险、债务代理风险而降低公司的债务融资成本,债务融资成本的降低效应在处于财务困境的公司更为显著。
In recent years,the phenomenon of associated guarantee has become more and more frequent.As a financing mechanism,associated guarantee is to solve the information asymmetry problem of credit.Based on2007-2016data of A-share listed companies,this paper analyzes the influence of the company′s acceptance of associated guarantee on its cost of debt,and conducts an empirical test from two aspects of information risk and debt agency risk.Research shows that accepting associated guarantees can reduce the corporate cost of debt,the associated guarantee reduces the degree of accrual and real earnings management of the company and improves the quality of earnings;the reduction effect of associated guarantee on the cost of debt is more significant in firms that are not audited by the big four accounting firms and that in lower marketization degree.The above conclusions show that the associated guarantee can reduce the cost of debt by reducing corporate information risk and debt agency risk,and the reduction of the cost of debt is more significant in companies that in financial distress.
作者
张俊民
李会云
宋婕
ZHANG Jun-min;LI Hui-yun;SONG Jie(School of Accounting, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222,China;Departmentof Accounting, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics Pearl River College, Tianjin 301811,China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第12期75-80,共6页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目
项目编号:71272189
天津财经大学研究生科研资助计划项目
项目编号:2017TCB08
作者简介
张俊民(1960-),男,山东鱼台人,天津财经大学会计学院教授,博士生导师,管理学博士,研究方向:会计监管、审计质量与内部控制.李会云(1987-),女,石家庄人,天津财经大学会计学院博士研究生,天津财经大学珠江学院会计学系讲师,研究方向:资本市场财务会计与审计.宋婕(1986-),女,山东济宁人,天津财经大学会计学院博士研究生,研究方向:资本市场财务会计与审计。
