摘要
基于近代公司治理理论的"利益侵占假说",大股东可能通过上市公司的关联担保进行"隧道挖掘",侵占中小股东的利益。近年来,中国证券市场上,作为公司治理的可能参与者,机构投资者发展迅猛。在资本市场的发展获得了新的契机之下,机构投资者有能力、有动力抑制大股东的挖掘行为。选取2008年沪深两市A股的183个样本,采用二元Logistic回归模型,研究发现,机构投资者持股比例与上市公司关联担保显著负相关,说明机构投资者对关联担保存在抑制效应。同时,我们发现,绝对控股股东持股比例与上市公司关联担保显著负相关。即绝对控股股东持股比例越高,绝对控股股东越不倾向于采用关联担保方式进行"隧道挖掘"。
Based on the expropriation hypothesis in the theory of modern corporate governance,large shareholders in listed companies would be tunneling by assurance,occupy the interests of minority shareholders.In recent years,institutional investors,as a possible participant in corporate governance,have developed rapidly in Chinese stock market.Obtained a new opportunity by the development of capital markets,institutional investors had ability and motion to restrain the tunneling behavior by large shareholders.We selected 183 samples from A shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in 2008,using binary Logistic regression model,found the proportion of institutional investors holding a significant negative correlation associated with assurance in listed companies,indicating the existence of suppression effect associated with assurance by institutional investors.Meanwhile,we found that the proportion of absolute control of shareholders in listed companies holding a significant negative correlation associated with assurance.The higher proportion of absolute control of shareholders,the less the absolute controlling shareholder tend to use the way of assurance associated with tunneling.
出处
《经济研究导刊》
2011年第12期69-72,共4页
Economic Research Guide
关键词
机构投资者
关联担保
抑制效应
实证研究
institutional investors
assurance
suppression effect
empirical study
作者简介
张虎（1970-），男，江苏泗洪人，高级经济师，硕士研究生，从事金融研究；
朱江（1981-），男，江苏宿迁人，中级会计师，中国注册会计师，硕士研究生，从事公司理财研究。
