摘要
地方政府作为中国市场经济发展中的一支重要力量,在推动中国区域及经济发展中发挥着重要作用。已有研究基于中央-地方关系及地方政府之间的相互竞争等视角,侧重于分析地方政府在既有激励约束条件下会"如何作为"。文章基于实践,总结提出将中国地方政府拟化为一个理性经济主体-"公司",从"经营公司"的视角来理解地方政府在外部机制和制度约束下的运作逻辑,以此分析地方政府城市经营的逻辑。研究表明,在中国分税制、土地制度、土地产权制度、户籍制度和社会保障制度等多重约束下,地方政府"公司化"运营行为导致了地方上较高的土地财政规模和过去几十年中"化地不化人"的城市化模式。
As an important participate in the development of China’s market economy,local governments play a central role in promoting China’s economic development. To understand the rapid growth of China’s economy,it is vital to understand the behaviors of local governments. With regard to the operation model of local governments in China,previous researches are mainly carried out on the reciprocal relationship between the central and local governments,the competitions among local governments,and the behavioral patterns of local governments under the unique institutional framework in China,which focuses on how local governments would react to the incentives and institutional constraints. However,researches on how local governments actually perform are relatively in short. This paper makes an innovative proposal to explore the pattern of local governments from the micro-behavioral perspective. In the model,local governments are regarded as an indigenous subject of behaviors in the Chinese economic development system to analyze its specific operational logics. This paper proposes to view Chinese local governments as rational economic subjects, just like 'companies',to understand the behavioral pattern of local governments from the perspective of 'company operation',which makes it easier to understand how local governments will perform under the constraints of the external system. According to the research,we conclude that local governments are just like rational companies,trying their best to maximize the fiscal revenue,including tax,land revenue,minimize the fiscal expenditure of some aspects,such as expenditure on local education,sanitary fixture,and maximize the expenditure on other areas,such as city construction,land development. According to the logics of the model,we analyze the logics of local governments’ actions in urban operation,and explore the logics of China’s land fiscal,China’s urbanization model and its path. The research shows that,under the constraints of China’s tax institutions,land institutions,land property institutions,household registration system and social security system,the logics of the 'corporatization' of local governments lead to China’s rapid development of land fiscal,which has been the main and steady revenue channel of local governments since later 1990s. Meanwhile,the logics are applied to the urbanization model of 'land,no people'of China in the past few decades,under the model that local governments can benefit from the land selling and do not need to burden the costs of people urbanization.
作者
朱鹏扬
李雪峰
李强
Zhu Pengyang;Li Xuefeng;Li Qiang(School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China;School of Social Development and Public Policy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期17-29,共13页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
政府行为模式
激励约束机制
政府公司化经营
土地财政
城市化
government behavioral model
incentive and constraint mechanism
corporatization model of local governments
land fiscal
urbanization
作者简介
朱鹏扬(1973-),男,江苏徐州人,上海财经大学经济学院博士研究生;李雪峰(1979-),女,云南临沧人,复旦大学社会发展与公共政策学院博士后流动站研究人员;李强(1980-),男,重庆市人,上海财经大学经济学院博士研究生。
