摘要
作为典型的双边市场,边际成本为零以及间接网络效应都使得脱胎于工业时代的反垄断法律体系难以对以谷歌为代表的互联网平台公司做出有效规制。更为严重的是,快速变化的技术创新和日益复杂的商业模式使得互联网市场的不确定性空前膨胀,传统的基于"委托-代理"的反垄断治理模式已经面临困境。为适应治理环境的这种变化,理论界提出扬弃既有框架而代之以"实验主义治理"的解决方案。实验主义治理理论强调通过"改变现状"和"共同学习"等机制设计来解决多元合作的激励和不确定性的处理问题。本文试图通过对谷歌(欧洲)反垄断调查案的分析,说明实验主义治理理论在互联网平台反垄断领域的应用机理,并希望以此为起点继续探索未来的"破局"之道。
As a typical two-sided market,both of the zero marginal cost and the indirect network effect affect the effectiveness of traditional legal system considering the anti-trust regulation of internet platform giant,such as Google.The growing uncertainty brought by rapid technical innovation and complex business model also makes things worse.To fit with the change of governance environment,scholars proposed a new theory named'Experimentalist Governance'to substitute the traditional way focusing on 'Principal Agent'structure.The 'Experimentalist Governance'mainly emphasizes the mechanism design to solve the practical problem,of which the two basic mechanisms include the'Destabilization Regimes'and the 'Co-learning'.In this background,this article analyses the anti-trust investigation case against Google by the European Commission to prove how the'Experimentalist Governance'theory can be applied in this field and how these two mechanism are embodied in this case.
出处
《财经法学》
2015年第5期117-125,共9页
Law and Economy
关键词
双边市场
不确定性
反垄断
实验主义治理
Two-sided market Uncertainty Antitrust Experimental governance
