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Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy:Evidence from China 被引量:15

Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy:Evidence from China
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摘要 Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008,this study empirically tests the impact of family control,institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies.Our results indicate that(1)family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms;(2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies;and(3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms.Somewhat surprisingly,we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem Ⅰ(the owner-manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem Ⅱ(the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict),and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy.In contrast,a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem 1 and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends. Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008,this study empirically tests the impact of family control,institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies.Our results indicate that(1)family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms;(2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies;and(3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms.Somewhat surprisingly,we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem Ⅰ(the owner-manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem Ⅱ(the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict),and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy.In contrast,a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem 1 and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.
出处 《China Journal of Accounting Research》 2011年第Z1期29-46,共18页 中国会计学刊(英文版)
基金 supported by the Program for New Century Excellent Talent at University(Grant No.NCET-06-0565) the Foundation of the Key Research Institution of Humanities and Social Science at University(Grant No.07JJD630009)of the Ministry of Education of China the National Nature Science Foundation of China(Grant No.G0205-70572092)
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