摘要
在我国的上市公司中,本文发现国家持股规模和公司绩效之间呈现左高右低的非对称U型关系。总体而言,国家持股企业的表现不及非国家持股企业。同时,随着国家持股比例的上升,企业绩效起初随之下降;但是,当国家持股比例足够大时,随着国家持股比例的上升,企业绩效上升。这就是说,国家持股对企业的绩效具有两面性的影响。作为事实上的国有股东,政府存在着政治和经济双重利益,从而既通过政治干预攫取企业财富,又借助公司治理和优惠待遇来提升关联企业的价值。国有股减持应该避免U型曲线的底部价值陷阱。
In this paper, we develop a view of the government shareholder as an entity that can both damage and benefit the companies in which it holds shares. We examine the ownership and control of 826 corporations listed on China＇s stock market, and find that government shareholding therein is notably large. Its effect on corporate value is negative, but non-monotonic. Up to a certain threshold, corporate value decreases as government shareholding stakes increase, but beyond this threshold, as government shareholding stakes continue to increase, corporate value also begins to do so. We argue that this concave relationship comes from the grabbing hand and the helping hand of the government shareholder and the influences of two hands vary upon the size of government shareholding.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第10期48-58,共11页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金"企业业绩
公司重组和国家持股"项目的支持(项目号70373012)。
关键词
国有股权
股权结构
公司治理
Ownership Structure
Government Shareholding
Corporate Governance
