摘要
在我国对赌第一案——海富投资案的审判中,投资方与融资企业签订的对赌协议因"脱离了公司的经营业绩,有损公司及公司债权人的利益"而被最高人民法院判定无效。本文参照对赌第一案的对赌方式,建立了私募股权投资机构与企业对赌的报童模型,在供应链的视角下,探讨了投融资双方对赌时业绩目标的设置问题。发现了同时有利于投融资双方能促进双方合作的"协作绩效区间",并进一步分析了影响该区间的主要因素。为科学的设置对赌业绩目标提供了理论基础。
In the trial of the first case of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism（VAM） — Haifu investment case in China, the valuation adjustment mechanism entered into between the investor and financing company was ruled invalid on the ground that it is beyond the company＇s operating capacity, and will damage the interests of the company and its creditors. This paper refers to the mechanism designed in The First Case of VAM, and establishes a newsvendor model which contains a VAM between the private equity（PE） and the financing company. It studies the setting problem of the performance objective in a VAM under the supply chain perspective. And it discovers a ＂Cooperation Performance Interval＂ which benefits both the PE and the financing company and could promote bilateral cooperation. Meanwhile, the main factors affecting this interval is also analyzed. This paper provides a theoretical basis for scientific setting of the performance objective.
作者
邓杰
于辉
Deng Jie;Yu Hui(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 40003)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第9期23-37,共15页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71571024)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(15YJA630058
14YJA630087)
关键词
对赌协议
业绩目标
协作绩效区间
报童模型
valuation adjustment mechanism
performance objective
cooperation performance interval
newsvendor model
作者简介
邓杰，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生。;通讯作者：于辉，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
