摘要
本文利用异质性随机边界模型,定量估算了中国上市公司的治理效率。在此基础上,进一步分析了股权结构和高管激励对上市公司治理效率及其不稳定性的影响。结果表明:(1)中国大部分上市公司存在治理低效,效率比最优水平低了约35%-80%,平均治理效率仅为41.7%,但从时间趋势来看,中国上市公司的治理效率略有下降并逐渐趋于平稳;(2)公司股权集中度的提高、股东制衡力的增强以及高管激励政策的实施有助于提升公司的治理效率;(3)中国国有上市公司的治理效率普遍低于非国有上市公司,但二者之间的差距在逐步缩小。
This paper estimates the efficiency of the governance of China's listed companies by using the heterogeneity stochastic frontier model. On this basis,the paper analyzes the effect of the ownership structure and executive incentive on the efficiency of the corporate governance and its instability. The results show that:( 1) the governance efficiency of China's listed firms declines 35- 80% due to the agency conflicts,with average efficiency at 41. 7%; the governance efficiency of China's listed companies shows an upward trend.( 2)With the ownership concentration and shareholders' balance increasing,and executive incentive policy effectively implemented,the efficiency of corporate governance will be enhanced.( 3) Further analysis shows that governance efficiency of China's state-owned listed companies is generally lower than the non-state-owned listed companies,but the gap between the two becomes gradually narrower.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期128-139,共12页
Management Review
基金
河南省软科学基金项目(132400410022)
河南省哲学社会科学规划基金项目(2012BJJ043)
河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(2015-QN-217)
关键词
股权结构
高管激励
治理效率
异质性随机边界模型
ownership structure,executive incentive,governance efficiency,stochastic frontier model