摘要
在一些同时存在消费者寻求多样化购买和拥塞效应的行业,寡头厂商广泛使用基于消费者购买历史进行歧视定价的商业模式,文章建立了动态博弈模型针对这类行业和商业模式进行了深入研究。研究结果表明厂商实施歧视定价源于消费者寻求多样化购买,而且消费者寻求多样化和拥塞效应会导致厂商每一期产生"默契合谋"。与统一定价相比,歧视定价会增加消费者福利,降低社会总福利。进一步的定价策略选择研究发现,寡头厂商都会选择获利较少的歧视性定价策略,陷入"囚徒困境"的境地。对于文章所研究的行业,厂商应该利用信息技术,积极使用这种定价策略,而公共政策不应过多地干预。
In some industries with consumer variety-seeking and congestion effect, firms can often use discriminatory pricing scheme by consumer purchasing history. In this paper, we build up a two-stage game model to investigate this economic phenomenon. As for our research results, we can show that both market en- vironmental factors, namely consumer variety-seeking and congestion effect, can lead to firms＇ own market power, but the main reason for firm discriminatory pricing is consumer variety-seeking. After the purchase during the first phase, consumer variety-seeking leads to differences in consumers＇ valuation of the products, and finns can effectively distinguish different consumer groups, leading to market segmentation and discrimin- atory pricing during the second phase. The firms offer discounting prices for loyal consumers, but charge new customers higher prices, trying to attract repeat purchases of old customers and avoid too much loss of old cus- tomers. Because the congestion effect on all consumers is consistent, it will not lead to the differences in con- sumers＇ valuation of products, and it is impossible for firms to make discriminatory pricing. But the conges- tion effect can restrain the firms from reducing prices to attract consumers, and weaken the competition between the firms, resulting in the ＂tacit collusion＂ between oligarchic firms. In fact, we also find that both market environmental factors weaken price competition. Compared with uniform pricing, discriminatory pri- cing results in lower equilibrium prices during two phases, and both the equilibrium profits and social welfare are also lower, but consumers gain higher surplus. Further pricing strategy choice shows that discriminatory pricing based on consumer purchasing history selected by both two firms is an equilibrium result, leading to lower profits of two firms, thus they fall into the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂. This paper explores the general wel- fare standard and the competition policy about the discriminatory pricing based on consumer purchasing his- tory. The discriminatory pricing based on consumer purchasing history belongs to the third-degree price dis- crimination. Discriminatory pricing does not increase the total quantities of goods, so total social welfare falls. In general, in an industry with consumer variety-seeking and congestion effect, there is very sufficient compet- ition between firms, which have almost no market power, and firms＇ pricing behavior is more benefcial to con- sumers. The loss of social welfare mainly comes from consumer variety-seeking; it is very difficult to under- stand the information of characteristics of consumers, and there is a great deal of information costs. For these reasons, we believe that the competition policy should allow firms to adopt such pricing strategies and should not make too much intervention. The antitrust authorities should be cautious, and only confirmed that firms with such a pricing strategy have a dominant market position, can it intervene in finn behavior.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期100-112,共13页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71172139)
教育部基地重大项目"高速公路产业竞争政策适用性与难点问题"
关键词
多样化购买
滞留成本
拥塞效应
价格歧视
统一定价
variety seeking
staying cost
congestion effect
discriminatory pricing
uniform pricing
作者简介
蒋传海（1970-），男，安徽濉溪人，上海财经大学国际工商管理学院教授，博士生导师;杨万中（1970-），男，安徽六安人，常州工学院经济与管理学院副教授；;朱蓓（1981-），女，上海人，上海财经大学国际工商管理学院博士生。
