摘要
为系统分析网约车与行业原有主体的矛盾,从网约车的视角,综合考虑市场份额和利润效益,采用博弈论的方法,分别讨论网约车与传统出租车、乘客、政府之间的利益冲突.构建最优策略博弈模型并进行分析,求解混合策略博弈均衡解.结果表明:网约车与传统出租车均无策略选择最优概率,将处于持续的互相博弈状态中,网约车优劣服务成本差和价格是乘客选择乘坐与否的关键因素,政府管制成本和对非法经营的罚金是促使网约车合法经营的关键因素,为网约车自身发展和政府对网约车的监管提供理论支持和决策建议.
In order to analyze the contradiction between car-hailing and intrinsic taxi industry stakeholders,the conflicts between car-hailing and traditional taxi,passengers and government are analyzed respectively with game theory by considering market share and profit efficiency. The optimal game strategy models are built and solved to find the game equilibrium of mixed strategies. The results indicate that neither car-hailing and traditional taxi have strategies to choose optimal probability and will be in unremitting game playing. The difference of the cost and the price of the service are the key factors affecting passengers to ride. The cost of government regulation and fines of illegal business are key factors that promoting the legal operation of car-hailing.
出处
《大连交通大学学报》
CAS
2017年第6期6-11,共6页
Journal of Dalian Jiaotong University
关键词
网约车
市场份额与利润
博弈论
最优策略
混合策略
carhailing
the market share and profit efficiency
game theory
optimal strategy
mixed strategy
作者简介
张亚平（1966-）,男,教授,博士,主要交通规划与设计、交通流理论的研究E-mail：mojiongcop＠163.com.
