摘要
分析了股权众筹融资方和投资方的最优策略.依据股权众筹的流程,构建了股权众筹过程中投融资方利益博弈的3阶段模型,并在同时满足融资方与投资方预期收益最大化的条件下,求解了相应的最优化问题并给出了投融资方最优策略的解析式.研究结果表明,在参数满足一定条件时,股权众筹投融资方均存在最优策略,且最优策略受边际收益、项目成功概率、预期回报率等因素的影响.
This paper studies the optimal strategy for entrepreneur and investors in equity crowdfunding. Based on the general procedure for equity crowdfunding, a three-step model is established to characterize the gam- bling behaviors between the entrepreneur and the investors. To maximize the expected utility of the enterprise and investors, three optimal problems are solved and the optimal strategy for each stage is given. The results indicate that when parameters satisfying certain condition, optimal strategies for the investors and entrepreneur exist, which are influenced by marginal revenue, the probability of project succeed, expected rate of return, etc.
作者
曾燕
梁思莹
田凤平
魏嘉伟
ZENG Yah LIANG Si-ying TIAN Feng-ping WEI Jia-wei(Lingnan（University） College, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China International School of Business ＆ Finance, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China School of Mathematics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第9期113-126,共14页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571195)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(15CJY004)
霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金资助项目(151081)
广东省自然科学杰出青年基金资助项目(2015A030306040)
关键词
股权众筹
最优投融资策略
项目价值
异质性投资者
多方博弈
equity crowdfunding
optimal strategy for entrepreneur and investors
project＇ s expected value
heterogeneous investors
multiplayer game
作者简介
通讯作者：田凤平（1983-），女，湖南常德人，博士，讲师．Email：ffengp@mail．sysu．edu．cn
