摘要
本文基于Gallego和van Ryzin的两级价格策略,构建了两种竞争性易逝品降价时点设定问题的Cournot博弈模型,应用图解法求得Cournot均衡点,得出在竞争环境下先动企业会推迟降价时点而后动企业会提前降价的结论,通过实例分析验证了这一结论,同时指出了转移概率对均衡结果的影响。研究结果可为竞争环境下易逝性产品降价策略的制定提供决策支持。
This paper deals with a kind of specific retailing that sells a fixed stock of perishable goods over a finite horizon. A Cournot game model is proposed based on Gallego and Van Ryzin＇s two-price policy. The Cournot equilibrium point is found out in the figure of the strategy sets. It is found that the optimal markdown timing of the leading product will be delayed and that of the following product will be advanced. A numerical example is provided and the effect of the customer＇s transfer probability p between suppliers on the equilibrium of the game is analyzed. The model proposed in this paper is helpful for the suppliers to determine the markdown timing of perishable products when the competitiveness exists.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2006年第3期45-50,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371019)
南京理工大学经济管理学院青年基金资助项目
关键词
易逝品
收益管理
动态定价
博弈
perishable product
revenue management
dynamic pricing
game
作者简介
杨慧（1977-），女（汉族），江苏铜山人，南京大学工程管理学院博士生，南京理工大学经济管理学院讲师，研究方向：生产与运作管理．
