摘要
以2010—2016年度沪深A股上市公司为样本,从公司持有现金的经济后果——公司投资的视角,考察公司治理对超额持有现金的影响及其作用机理。研究发现,公司超额持有现金下的投资行为并不必然与代理理论的观点相一致,进而得出公司治理水平只在超额持有现金水平高的公司中,才能对过度投资具有显著的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,公司治理的抑制作用是通过提高现金持有价值来实现的,而这在超额持有现金水平高的公司中更为显著。以上的研究打破了学者们对代理理论的认识误区,较为全面的考察了超额持有现金与公司投资间的关系,并为理解治理机制的适用性和作用机理提供了实证资料,为公司适当改动治理机制做出了决策建议。
This paper is based on analysis of the consequences of the cash holdings of China＇s listed companies from 2010 to 2016,to study the relationships between corporate governance and excess cash holdings from the view of corporate investment,and further analyzes whether the level of corporate governance has different effects on excess cash holdings and the corresponding mechanism. Our study finds that the relationships between the cash holdings and over-investment are dynamical. The listed companies＇ excess cash holdings have positive influence on over-investment when the firms hold the higher level of cash holdings. But when the level of excess cash holdings is lower,the positive effect is not significant. Furthermore,the positive impact of excess cash holdings on over-investment is lower if the firm is well governed and the level of cash holdings is higher.Therefore,the improvement of corporate governance is the effective mechanism to prevent the over-investment when the firms have more cash holdings. Finally,the paper also finds that corporate governance can influence the value of cash holdings to change the effect of investment. This paper breaks mistaken ideas about agency theory and adds the documents of the study about the relationships between excess cash holdings and investment. It is meaningful for us to understand the mechanism about corporate governance and improve it correctly.
出处
《南京财经大学学报》
2017年第4期67-77,共11页
Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics
关键词
超额持有现金
公司投资
公司治理
现金持有价值
excess cash holdings
investment
corporate governance
value of cash holdings
作者简介
袁卫秋（1972-），男，江苏泰州人，南京财经大学副教授，研究方向为公司财务与理论；
朱红（1992-），女，安徽马鞍山人，南京财经大学在读研究生，研究方向为公司财务与理论。
