摘要
DIP制度在美国经历了实践产生、立法否认、立法确认的反复而曲折的过程,时至今日,该制度已经成为美国商事重整制度的基石。中国在借鉴DIP制度的基础上确立了债务人自行管理制度,但该制度并未受到足够重视。实际上,债务人掌握着不受约束的重整程序启动权,其在重整期间维持营业事务、引进重组方、推动针对重整计划的谈判及促进重整获得成功方面也具有积极作用,为了激发重整制度的活力,应当适度强化债务人对重整程序的控制权。与此同时,在中国股东会中心主义的公司文化下,债务人自行管理实际系股东的管理,此种模式的弊端集中体现在股东通过重整计划中各种权益的调整而实现的对债权人的掠夺,相关的实证研究对此进行了揭示。基于实用主义的角度论证债务人对于重整的积极作用,以及其所可能产生的风险并加以防范,是本文的基本思路。
The DIP system in the United States has experienced the process of emergency,denial of legislation,and the legislative confirmation.To this day,the system has become the cornerstone of the U.S.On the basis of drawing lessons from the DIP system,China has established the debtor’s self management system,but the system has not been paid enough attention.In fact,the debtor holds the right to start the restructuring process without constraints,and has positive effects in the period of reorganization to maintain business affairs,introduce the reorganization parties,promote the negotiation of the reorganization plan and push the success of restructuring.In order to stimulate the vitality of the reorganization system,the debtor should be strengthened to control the reorganization procedure.It should be noted that under the corporate culture of the shareholder centered doctrine in China,the shareholders realized the predatory of the creditors through the adjustment of various interests in the reorganization plan.The basic idea of this paper is to demonstrate the positive role of the debtor in the reorganization and the possible risks to prevent from the perspective of pragmatism.
出处
《中国政法大学学报》
CSSCI
2017年第3期43-55,共13页
Journal Of CUPL
作者简介
[作者]许胜锋（1977-），男，广东陆丰人。现为北京市中伦律师事务所高级合伙人，吉林大学法学院理论法学专业博士研究生。研究方向为破产法。
