摘要
当前,第三方支付机构隐藏的较大风险已对中国相关监管制度形成了巨大挑战。基于静态与动态演化博弈模型,本文主要从理论上研究了监管第三方支付机构的最佳策略。本文认为,监管第三方支付机构宜以合规性激励手段为主;第三方支付机构的法律定位应与监管体制相对应,中国现行的将支付机构定位为"非金融机构"的做法仅可作为风险谨慎管理的权宜之计,长期来看不利于金融创新;"对机构实施全面监管、对核心业务和功能实施重点监管"的组合监管模式更适合于中国;中国应尽快落实第三方支付的沉淀资金强行托管和运营信息严格披露等监管制度。
In recent years,the third-party payment industry is hidden with huge risks and these risks have created a huge challenge to China＇s existing regulation system.Based on static and evolutionary game model,this paper makes a research on the best strategy of supervision on third-party payment theoretically.According to this paper,methods of supervising third-party payment should be motivation for compliance.Secondly,the legal position of third-party payment institutions should correspond to the existing financial supervision system,seeing them as non-financial institutions can only be an expedient for risk management,it will have negative effects on financial creation from the long run.Thirdly,it is much more adaptable for China to combine the supervision pattern of overall supervision for institutions and key supervision for service and function.Finally,we should focus on the supervision on the trusteeship system of precipitation funds and information disclosure system at present.
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期49-60,共12页
China Economic Studies
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(14ZDA043)
国家社科基金重点项目(名称:我国移动支付风险的识别
度量与管控)
江苏省创新经济研究基地的资助
关键词
第三方支付
静态博弈
演化博弈
监管策略
third-party payment
static game model
evolutionary game model
supervision strategy
作者简介
封思贤，南京师范大学商学院，博士，教授，博士生导师；
包丽红，南京师范大学商学院，硕士研究生。
