摘要
在快速推进住房保障工作的背景下,较多地方政府选择在城市边缘区域集中成片地建设保障房的现象值得引起重视。尽管理论研究已充分论述了集中建设模式可能引发的负面问题,但在经济分权与纵向政治控制相结合所形成的一体化结构中,地方政府的选择符合有限自主性的行为逻辑。地方政府既要遵从现有的政治激励制度安排,又要实现财政收益的最大化。为了完成中央政府提出的保障房建设任务,面对地方可用财力相对不足的约束,只有选择在城市边缘区域集中成片地建设保障房,但这必将对后续的社会治理提出严峻挑战。
As China＇s housing security is being promoted rapidly, local governments generally build affordable housing intensively in the urban fringe area though theoretical research and policy advice have sufficiently addressed the negative impacts of this model. In the structure of economic decentralization and vertical political control, the choice of local governments accords to the behavioral logic of limited autonomy. It is necessary for local governments not only to comply with the existing political incentive arrangements but to maximize the financial gains. In order to complete the plan of affordable housing construction, in the context of relative lack of local available financial resources, the only choice for local governments is to build affordable housing in the urban fringe area. But this will be a serious challenge to social governance in the future.
出处
《同济大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期100-108,共9页
Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition
关键词
地方政府
保障房
有限自主
行为逻辑
local government
affordable housing
limited autonomy
behavioral logic
作者简介
严荣，上海市房地产科学研究院副院长，副研究员。
