摘要
在低碳环境下,研究了制造商向具有公平偏好的零售商提供不同契约的供应链协调问题。以政府总量限制交易和碳排放权交易为背景,分别讨论了零售商具有公平偏好时,批发价格契约、收益共享契约和回购契约对供应链协调的影响,最后通过数值分析对结论进行验证。结果表明,考虑分配公平后批发价格契约在特定的条件下可以协调供应链,收益共享契约及回购契约等价性不变仍然可以实现供应链协调。
The operation modes of supply chains have been transferring to low-carbonization modes in order to cope with the growing demand for the low-carbon economy. Enterprises with low-carbon culture emit less carbon. Carbon emission rights are one kind of flowing resource and have property value which can help enterprises obtain profit through the trade of carbon emission. Consequently,the traditional two-dimensional transaction mode,composed of material purchasing and finished products,is changing to the threedimensional transaction mode. Cost structures and revenue functions are different under this new trend. Because of the diversity and complexity of supply chain operation performance,decision makers may have some non-fully rational considerations,such as fairness preferences.The research in the field of behavioral operation management shows that rational assumptions always cause system errors when describing and predicting human behaviors. In practice,decision makers usually consider factors of fair allocation. They want to give up a proportion of profit in order to pursue more equitable results. Although this behavior is contrary to the rational human assumption,some empirical and experimental studies have proved the existence of such behavioral preference.In the context of low-carbon environment,this paper investigates the problem of supply chain coordination with a manufacturer providing different contracts for the retailer who has the fairness preference with the existing research ideas. Under the environment of cap-and-trade and carbon emission trade,we discuss the effect of a wholesale-price contract,a revenue-sharing contract,and a buyback contract on supply chain coordination. Finally,a numerical case is presented to test the results.A two-echelon supply chain consists of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer where a single-period product is studied. In the first part,it presents basic assumptions and symbol descriptions. The retailer faces a newsvendor problem and market demand is stochastic. In the second part,the Stackelberg game model has been constructed. We discuss coordination conditions under three different contracts and provide conclusions. In the end,we make a summary for the whole paper.The conclusions show that after considering fairness preferences,the wholesale-price contract can coordinate supply chains under some certain circumstances. The revenue-sharing contract and the buyback contract can coordinate the entire supply chain.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期156-161,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072155)
关键词
供应链契约
公平偏好
协调
总量限制交易
碳排放权
supply chain contract
fairness preference
coordination
cap-and-trade
carbon emission right
作者简介
李媛（1985-），女（满族），河北石家庄人，博士研究生，主要从事物流与供应链管理研究。
