摘要
公司治理转型背景下,突破单一的内部治理范式,完善以债权人治理为代表的公司外部治理机制,是推进上市公司由行政型治理向经济型治理的重要途径。风险防御驱动下的债权人治理机制是抑制上市公司非效率投资行为,实现债权人权益保护的公司重要外部治理机制。通过在不同控股环境下对异质性债权人防御型治理与上市公司非效率投资水平的关系进行实证研究发现:民营上市公司中,银行的防御型治理对民营上市公司非效率投资具有显著的抑制效应,而在国有上市公司中,其抑制效应稍显乏力;而在两种控股环境中,商业信用债权人的防御型治理不仅失效,反而对非效率投资水平产生刺激效应。
With the transformation of corporate governance in China, breaking the simplex internal governance paradigm and improving external governance mechanism characterized by creditor governance is an important way to promote listed companies changing from administration - ori- ented governance into economic - oriented governance. Creditor governance under the drive of risk defense is an important external governance mechanism both for the control of the inefficient investment of listed companies and the protection of creditors rights. By carrying out an empirical analysis on the relationship between the defensive governance of heterogeneous creditors and inefficient investment of listed companies in different share -controlling environment, the author finds out that the defensive governance of banks has significant moderating effect on the inefficient investment of private listed companies, but the effect is not so strong in state - owned listed companies. In the two share - holding environments, the defensive governance mechanism of trade creditors not only failed to work, instead, it stimulates the inefficient investment.
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期114-122,共9页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(11YJC630150)
山东大学自主创新基金项目(YZC12020)
关键词
防御型治理
非效率投资
控股环境
Defensive Governance
Inefficient Investment
Share - controlling Environment
作者简介
作者简介：王旭（1985-），男，山东淄博人，山东大学管理学院博士研究生，研究方向为公司治理。
