摘要
近年来,大学生就业市场的持续竞争,导致越来越多的学生开始将"继续深造"作为自己的追求目标。文章在Spence教育博弈模型的基础上,对模型中的假设条件进行拓展,以贴近现实的扩展模型来对教育信号模型加以改进,使其应用范围更加广泛。在此基础上,研究发现真正解决教育信号传递问题的根源在于教育公平,通过教育机会的均等、助学体系的保障和行政资源的配比,使有能力的学生得到更好的教育才是保证大学毕业生充分就业的前提。
Since it＇s harder to get jobs in recent years,more and more college graduates begin to pursue the further studies.With the analysis of the Spence Education Game Model and generally based on reviewing lots of literature,this pape treis to develop the supposition of the model and improves the Education Signaling Model by developing a more real extended model and to make the model more popular.It is found that the key to solve the problem of cheating in job-finding was the fair play,and the basements of job market equilibrium were the equal education opportunity,the perfect grants system and the preferential allocation policy.
出处
《教育学术月刊》
北大核心
2012年第5期35-38,共4页
Education Research Monthly
作者简介
韩松，男，北京大学光华管理学院博士研究生；
蔡剑，男，北京大学创新研究院执行院长，北京大学工学院院长（北京100871）。
