摘要
经济分权和政治集权并存以及中央政府引导地方政府之间"GDP竞赛"的过度竞争是中国式财政分权的核心内涵,本文在此背景下分析环境污染的原因。先从理论上提出假说,然后利用1999-2008年省级面板数据进行实证检验,最后得出结论:中国式财政分权确实增加了外溢性公共物品(如废水)以及覆盖全国的纯污染公共物品(如二氧化硫)的污染排放强度,但并没有增加地方污染公共物品(如固体废弃物)的污染排放强度;由于排污费收取的人为因素较大,排污费政策对污染物排放的抑制效应不明显;财政分权体制下地方政府有选择地放松了一些上缴税收高的工业企业的二氧化硫以及固体废物排放的监管,这样便呈现出污染物在不断增加,排污费的收入也在不断增加的局面。
Coexistence of economic decentralization and political centralization and excessive competition （ ＂GDP race＂） among local governments guided by central government are core essence of Chinesestyle fiscal decentralization. This paper focuses on the reason of environmental pollution under such background. Firstly, the paper proposes hypothesis theoretically, then it gives a empirical test using1999 -2008 provincial panel data The final conclusion is made that Chinese - style fiscal decentralization does increase the emission of spillover public goods （such as water） and nationwide pure pollution public goods （such as sulfur dioxide）, but does not increase the emission of local pollution public goods （such as solid waste） ; that sewage charges does not play an inhibitory effect on emissions ; that collection of sewage charges has many personal factors ; and that Chinese- style fiscal decentralization let local governments have a choice to loosen regulation of high sulfur dioxide emissions and solid waste in a number of industrial enterprises, thus presenting the current situation that pollution increases and the pollutant discharge fee income also increases.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期32-37,共6页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71073085)
关键词
财政分权
排污费
环境污染
fiscal decentralization
sewage charges
environmental pollution
作者简介
闰文娟（1984-）女，新疆哈密人．南开大学经济学院博士生
钟茂初（1965-），男，江西铜鼓人，南开大学经济学院教授，博士生导师。
