国际贸易争端解决机制的选择及有效性：理论与中国抉择被引量：8

Effectiveness of International Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism

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摘要国际贸易争端解决机制主要有双边谈判、诸边一体化以及多边WTO化解机制,相关国内外文献较少涉及这三种机制之间的选择和优劣比较。本文用一个博弈的理论框架,从国家及贸易产品市场类型差异的角度分析了不同解决机制下单国的福利以及世界的总福利状况。结果发现,对于具有市场势力的大国来说,参与国越少的机制对其越有利,而对于没有市场势力的小国则是参与国越多的机制对其越有利,同时多国参与的机制也更有利于世界的总福利。因此,中国在选择贸易争端解决机制时,必须根据争端商品的市场竞争情况及价格影响和控制能力进行合理抉择;而从我国大多数出口商品的市场特点看,越多国家参与的机制可能更加有利。 International trade dispute resolving mechanisms mainly include bilateral negotiations,regional integration and the WTO dispute settlement.Existing literatures seldom compare their different effects to different kinds of countries.The paper sets up a game model to analyze these measures' welfare to specific country as well as the whole world.The results show that countries with strong market power prefer settlements with fewer countries taking part in,while countries with weak market power prefer settlements with more countries taking part in,which benefits overall welfare of the whole world.

作者李春顶赵美英

机构地区中国社会科学院淮北师范大学经济与管理学院

出处《财贸经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第5期86-91,137,共6页 Finance & Trade Economics

基金国家社科基金青年项目(10CGJ023) 淮北师范大学青年课题项目(700271)的中期成果

关键词国际贸易贸易争端解决机制有效性 Trade Dispute,Settlement Mechanism,Effectiveness

分类号 F752.02 [经济管理—国际贸易]

作者简介李春顶，中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所助理研究员，100732；赵美英，淮北师范大学经济与管理学院讲师，235000。

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参考文献11

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