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基于质量风险的易逝品供应链协同质量控制 被引量:4

On the Risk-Based Collaborative Quality Control for Supply Chain of Perishable Goods
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摘要 以质量风险为基础,研究了易逝品供应链协同质量控制问题,考虑购买商质量评价信息隐匿、供应商质量预防信息隐匿以及两者都隐匿三种情况,基于供应商和购买商的质量风险分担水平分别构建了易逝品供应链协同质量控制的委托代理模型.通过优化决策出对供应商的质量缺陷惩罚水平和外部损失的分担份额,实现供应商和购买商追求自身收益最大的同时供应链整体收益最优的目标.最后,对各种情况的协同质量控制模型进行了算例分析. The risk-based solution to the problem of collaborative quality control for supply chain of perishable goods was investigated considering three cases,i.e.,the purchaser hid the information on quality evaluation,the supplier hid the information on quality prevention and both information was hidden.The principal-agent models of collaborative quality control for supply chain of perishable goods were developed according to the quality risk share level between the supplier and purchaser.Then,the penalty level for quality defect and the share to be taken by both parties for exterior loss were given via decision optimization so as to achieve the optimal objective,i.e.,the whole supply chain gain is biggest with the maximum profits available to either supplier or purchaser.A numerical example is given to illustrate the collaborative quality control model under different conditions.
出处 《东北大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2011年第1期145-148,共4页 Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971018 70721001) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-06-0292) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N100506001) 辽宁省经济社会发展课题(2010lktglx-17)
关键词 质量风险 易逝品 质量预防 质量评价 协同 质量控制 quality risk perishable goods quality prevention quality evaluation collaboration quality control
作者简介 张翠华(1971-),女,辽宁沈阳人,东北大学副教授,博士.
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参考文献13

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二级参考文献30

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