摘要
本文研究存在顾客抱怨的情形下,由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链质量控制问题。构建了制造商和零售商的博弈模型,分析了非对称信息情况下当顾客抱怨和外部故障成本分担系数发生变化时,制造商和零售商的最优质量检测水平的变化,并得出非对称信息情况下制造商的最优质量检测水平随顾客抱怨的增加而线性增加的结论。
This paper presents the problem of supply chain quality control considering customer complaint.It develops a quality control game model of the manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain and analyzes the changes of their optimal monitoring level when the cost sharing coefficient and customer complaint alter in asymmetric case.The conclusion is that the manufacturer’s optimal monitoring level increases linearly as customer complaint increases.
出处
《标准科学》
2013年第10期76-79,共4页
Standard Science
关键词
供应链质量
供应链博弈
非对称信息
顾客抱怨
supply chain quality
supply chain game
asymmetric information
customer complaint
