摘要
本文以W县高中学校教育运行为例,揭示了应试教育的运行机制——为了提高高考升学率,学校教育过程成为一种学业分类过程,对教师、学生和知识不断进行中心和边缘的区分。与该分类过程相配套的是学校组织层面所构建的以考试分数为基础的教育评估制度、经济激励制度和资源配置方式。通过广泛的利益动员,应试体制将学校组织中的所有行动者和资源有效统摄于升学这一目标之下。如何改革以高考分数为基础的评估制度,进而打破应试体制的利益整合机制,是今后高考改革应该关注的重点。
This paper describes the operating mechanism of the examination-oriented system: School education has changed into a classification process that divides teachers, students and knowledge into the center and the periphery in order to increase the enrollment rates.Correspondingly,based on scores of the National College Entrance Examination and enrollment rates,local governments and high schools build up their assessment systems and economic incentive systems,and allocate their resources.By various approaches of interest mobilization,the National College Entrance Examination integrates relevant actors into the examination-oriented system and makes the system so firmly that could resist any intervention from outside.To reform the National College Entrance Examination,it is critical to pay more attention to redesign assessment systems and establish corresponding incentive systems.
出处
《北京大学教育评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期71-81,共11页
Peking University Education Review
作者简介
陈彬莉，女，清华大学教育研究院博士后研究人员。
