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指类句研究的认知-语用意蕴 被引量:43

Cognitive-pragmatic implications of the study of generic sentences
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摘要 指类句是指明一类事物某一特征的句子。指类句的工作定义是:以隐性全称判断的形式,相对于一定的语用需要,为指明一类事物的某一特征而作出的特设判断。有些指类句存在反例,而指类句的特点是容忍反例。一个挑战性的问题是:指类句为什么可以容忍处于矛盾关系的反例?这个问题的澄清,对于如何认识和刻画事物的特征和属性,进行规律性的陈述,至为重要,这些正是指类句研究的认知-语用意蕴。 A generic sentence (GS) is a statement denoting a particular feature of a class of things, which is realized in an ad hoc judgment expressed in the form of an implicit universal sentence about the particular trait of the class of things selected in relation to a certain pragmatic motivation. Counterexamples (C) may occur in a GS, and the C and the GS are in the relation of contradiction, thus arises a challenging question why the C can be tolerated in a GS. The clarification of the issue is of great importance to the understanding and description of the features and properties of things concerned as well as the capturing of their regularity, which points to the cognitive-pragmatic implications of such studies.
作者 徐盛桓
出处 《外语教学与研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期83-91,共9页 Foreign Language Teaching and Research
基金 教育部人文社科项目“语言中的高层转喻思维机制研究”(项目号:09YJA740022)的资助
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参考文献17

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二级参考文献7

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