摘要
通常情况下,清政府社会控制机制的正常运转需要依靠绅士的辅佐,绅士充当了地方官府与民众之间调停人的角色。然而,当绅士本身的利益得不到满足甚至受到损害时,绅士阶层就可能与官府发生直接冲突和对抗。长沙抢米风潮中的官绅矛盾是一个典型例证。在长沙抢米风潮中,由于错综复杂的利益纠葛,绅士不但不能辅助官府,反而利用饥民情绪与官府对抗,致使官府应对乖方,无法控制事态发展。清政府强行抑制绅权,严惩肇事的旧绅士代表,使其逐渐疏离官府,而新绅士也因预备立宪进程缓慢对清政府产生失望情绪。由于官绅矛盾激化,官绅关系产生裂痕,传统社会控制机制运转失灵,从而根本动摇了清王朝的统治基础,使其迅速走向覆亡之路。
In normal circumstances, the Qing government operated its usual social control mechanisms with the assistance of the local gentry, who mediated between the local government and the people. However, the gentry could come into direct conflict and confrontation with the government if their interests were not satisfied or were encroached on. The government-local gentry conflict in the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910 can serve as a typical case. Because of complex and intricate conflicts of interest, the local gentry not only failed to help the local officials suppress the riot, but took advantage of the mood of the famine victims to confront the local officials. This threw them into disarray, rendering them unable to control the development of events. The Qing government suppressed the local gentry by force and inflicted severe punishment upon the representatives of the old gentry who had incited the riot, so that they lost their ties with government. The new gentry, on the other hand, had also lost faith in the government because of the delay in the preparation of the constitution. The escalation of the government-gentry conflict led to cleavage between the government and the local gentry. The failure of this traditional mechanism of social control undermined the rule of the Qing dynasty and accelerated its fall.
出处
《历史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期68-84,共17页
Historical Research
作者简介
李细珠，中国社会科学院近代史研究所研究员。北京100006
