摘要
一般来说,独立董事能够对管理层起到监督作用从而提高公司治理水平,然而在我国上市公司特殊的制度背景下,独立董事制度实施的效果究竟如何,一直是理论界和实务界争论的热点问题。本文引入"独立董事声誉"这一长期被忽视的独立董事制度设计的核心理念,构建了引入声誉机制的独立董事激励模型,并采用2004年至2005年沪市A股独立董事作为研究样本进行追踪,实证检验了我国上市公司独立董事所受到的声誉激励水平。研究发现我国独立董事的劳动力市场缺乏有效性,声誉激励只能够促使独立董事避开公开违规事件,却不能激励独立董事更好地履行监管职责。这很可能是影响我国独立董事制度发挥作用最重要的原因。
Generally speaking, independent directors play a supervision role in management, and they can improve corporate governance level. However, considering the particular system of Chinese listing companies, the hot issue argued by the theoretical circle and the practice field lies in the effectiveness of the independent director system. This article introduces the core concept of ＂the reputation of independent directors＂ which has been neglected in the designing of the independent director system for quite a long time, sets up the independent director incentive model which introduces the reputation mechanism, uses the samples of A - shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period of 2004 -- 2005, and conducts empirical test on the reputation incentive level of the independent directors of Chinese listing companies. The research finds out that the labor force market of the independent directors in China is lack of efficiency. The reputation incentives just encourage them to avoid open violations, but they can not motivate them to better perform their supervision function, which must be the most important factor influencing the implementation of the independent director system in China.
出处
《经济学家》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期5-15,共11页
Economist
基金
"中山大学人文社会科学青年研究基金项目"资助
关键词
独立董事声誉
独立董事劳动力市场
大股东控制
The reputation of independent directors
The labor force market of independent directors
Control of large shareholders
