摘要
财政联邦制的一个潜在消极后果是,地方政府竞相从事高风险投资项目等脱离中央监督的非正式财政活动,从而引起预算软约束,并导致政府债务的积累。如果地方政府都这么做,就会形成“太多而不能惩罚”的局面。文章还探讨了如何通过改变政府行为导向,改善政府治理来避免这类问题的可能性。
The political tournament and the corruption explain why China＇s local governments borrow money to pursuit the myopic and high-risk investment projects, which resulting in soft budget constraint and accumulation of local＇s debt. But when most locals do that, they are actually transferring the risk to the central government since there are too many locals doing wrong to be punished by the central government. Therefore, how to change the locals＇ goal is very important in order to improve the governance.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第2期90-99,共10页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
财政联邦制
非正式财政
预算软约束
网络外部性
fiscal federalism
informal finance
soft budget constraint
network externality
作者简介
陈健（1972-），男，福建南平人，中国社会科学院经济研究所副研究员。
