摘要
以2002年~2003年间中国上市公司为研究样本,从控股股东无偿占用上市公司资金的角度,详细考察了金字塔股权结构下控股股东的控制权、现金流量权以及二者的分离程度对其掠夺动机和行为的影响。研究发现,随着控股股东控制权增加而形成的壕沟防御效应加剧了其对中小投资者的利益侵害行为,随着现金流量权增加而形成的利益协同效应削弱了其攫取私利的动机,并且由金字塔股权结构引发的两权分离加剧了控股股东的掏空行为。进一步的研究表明,严厉、高效运转的税收体制提高了内部人掠夺行为的风险和成本,对控股股东的越权和违规行为形成有效的防范和制约。
From the perspective of controlling shareholders' embezzlement of listed companies' funds, this paper examines the effect of control rights, cash flow rights and the separation between them caused by pyramid structure on the controlling shareholders' economic incentives and behaviors based on Chinese listed companies for the period of 2002 to 2003. Presented empirical evidences show that the entrenchment effect associated with the increased control rights strengthens the controlling shareholders' behavior of tunneling, and the alignment effect associates with the increased cash rights mitigated controlling shareholders' incentives to tunnel, and the separation of control and ownership rights caused by pyramid structure sharpens the controlling shareholders' behavior of tunneling. Further empirical evidences indicate that stern and effective tax system should effectively curb controlling shareholders' embezzlement of listed companies' funds.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2007年第1期89-96,共8页
Journal of Management Science
关键词
税收努力
金字塔结构
控股股东
资金占用
tax effort
Pyramid structure
controlling shareholder
embezzlement of funds
作者简介
游家兴(1978-),男,福建莆田人,厦门大学管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:现代财务理论等。