摘要
从2003年开始,中国经济发生局部过热,银行信贷扩张是这次地方政府主导型投资过热的重要支撑和扩张加速器,归根到底是软预算约束机制导致银行信贷系统性风险开始积聚。本文通过建立地方政府、国有企业、银行三类主体的效用函数及其软预算约束模型,分析三方共谋贷款扩张的制度机理,解释目前信贷集中与扩张——软预算约束竞争——银行系统性风险三者之间的内生逻辑。
Since 2003, some economic sectors in China has suffered from the over-heating, in which, credit concentration and expanding are the important accelerators, while the soft budget constraint is the main impetus which accumulates systematic credit risk of bank. By building up the utility functions of local government, state-owned enterprise and state-owned bank and their soft budget constraint model, this paper analyzes the mechanism of complotting credit expansion, explains endogenetic logic of credit concentration and expansioncompetition of soft budget constraint-systematic risk of bank.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期40-48,共9页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
信贷集中
信贷扩张
预算软约束
系统性风险
credit concentration, credit expansion, soft budget constraint, systematic risk
作者简介
江曙霞(1955-),女,福建人,经济学博士,厦门大学金融系教授,博士生导师,研究方向为金融制度与金融监管。
罗杰(1970.8-),男,湖北人,华东交通大学经管学院讲师,厦门大学金融系2003级博士,主要研究制度金融学。
黄君慈(1978.1-),女,福建人,厦门大学金融系2003级博士,主要研究制度金融学。