摘要
本文研究了双头垄断市场技术创新和新产品开发中的跟随者优势。技术竞争的持续时间和研发成本对跟随者优势的存在以及这种优势的大小有着直接影响,如果研发成本低,双头垄断竞争表现为占先竞争,不存在跟随者优势;如果技术竞争主要基于研发投入,质量竞争从占先竞争转变为具有跟随者优势的等待竞争。
This paper researches second-mover advantages in technological innovation and market entrant in duopoly market. The time of adoption and the costs of research and development （R＆D） have direct effects on the existence and magnitude of a second-mover advantage, If R＆D costs are low and consequently the duopoly competition is mainly a preemption game, there is no second-mover advantage. In contrast,if technological competition is mainly R＆D effort-consuming, the game of quality competition changes its nature form preemption to a waiting game with second-mover advantage.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2005年第3期57-60,共4页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
关键词
双头垄断
产品创新
博弈
跟随者优势
duopoly market
product innovation
game
second-mover advantages
作者简介
楼高翔（1976-），男，浙江省义乌市人，华东理工大学工商经济学院管理科学与工程系助教，硕士，主要从事产业组织理论研究。
