摘要
对于知识型企业来说,有效的激励是激发知识型员工积极性与创造性的重要措施之一。由于知识型企业的价值创造及其溢价分配分别存在信息的不对称,为此,本文分析了企业与知识型员工的Stackelberg博弈行为,借助于理想状态的Pareto有效的完全合作模式的渐进演化过程,讨论合作博弈的机理与溢价的分配问题。研究表明知识型企业的短期与长期激励具有很强的互补性,适当地调节两者可以使企业系统收益递增;揭示了风险态度和地位是影响激励机制的关键因素。
<Abstrcat> Efficient incentive mechanisms can exert knowledge-employees' more creativeness for the knowledge-firms.Under the conditions of the two-stage information asymmetry of value creation and value-addition distribution within the process of firms'sustainable growth,this paper analyzes the Stackelberg game between firm and knowledge-employee,and addresses the mechanism and value-addition distribution of the co-op game behavior in virtue of the evolutionary process of the fully co-op model.The result suggests that the short-run incentive is significantly complementary with the long-run one,and to adjust properly the level of the two can maximize the systematic income of the firm.How to allot firm systematic premiums is further researched,and it is argued that knowledge-employees'risk attitude and position significantly influence the incentive effort.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2005年第3期108-114,共7页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(79970097
70102001)
关键词
知识型企业
博弈论
激励
knowledge-firm
game theory
incentive
