摘要
农村金融市场垄断背景下,新一轮农村利率改革并没有达到扩大农村信贷的目的,反而加大了农村的融资成本。原因在于:利率浮动范围扩大后,并没有形成农村信贷利率的市场定价机制,农信社只是简单地将信贷价格一浮到顶,以赚取更高的垄断利润。对福建东部两县(市)的调查显示,新一轮农村利率改革的成效并未达到政策设计意图。其原因可以用垄断市场结构下垄断定价与最优利率理论解释。真正建立起农村“两部门垂直合作型”金融组织体系,打破农村金融垄断,才能有效解决农村地区融资困境。
In order to ease the debt problem and promote rural development, China has relied on Rural Credit Cooperation (RCC) to achieve free interest rate in rural areas. However, rural loans has not increased in the reform, instead , financing cost ascended because the RCC simply raised Our investigation of eastern Fujian revealed that RCCs did not behave as the policy makers wished, they just choose to raise interest rate to the ceiling and did little to improve the mechanism. This paper explains the reason based on monopoly market structure and the optimal rate theory and suggests that China should reform the monopoly structure and build up a new rural financial system.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第5期7-13,共7页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金(70403019)中国人民大学科学研究基金(2003)的系列调研成果之一
关键词
农村金融
利率市场化
垄断市场
标会
Rural Finance, Interest Marketization, Monopoly Market, Rotating Savings and Credit Association
