摘要
以政府垄断型供给主导的国有商业银行制度变迁过程中,当直接控制国有银行的成本迅速上升时,政府效用函数将发生结构性优化,即从租金偏好向效率偏好转移。文章通过对国有银行改革的政府效用函数阶段性特征的分析,试图建立一个"二元结构两阶段"的政府效用函数模型,从而剖析我国国有银行改革的制度逻辑。
In the course of institutional change of government-dominated supply of China's state-owned commercial banks, the utility function of the government will see a process of constructional optimization, that is, preference of rent will be substituted by preference of efficiency when the cost directly controlling state-owned banks quickly increases. This paper attempts to establish a 'dual structure and two-stage' government utility function through analysis of the periodical characteristics of the government utility function in the process of state-owned commercial banks reform, so as to further analyse the institutional logic of the reforms of state-owned commercial banks.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第11期52-62,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
政府效用函数
租金偏好
效率偏好
动态优化
government's utility function
preference of rent
preference of efficiency
dynamic optimization
