摘要
受到“软权力”约束的基层斜向府际关系呈现出“抵制—协商”的互动模式,与传统府际关系中的“命令—服从”或“竞争—冲突”模式形成明显区别。以B市C区推进社会救助审批权下放改革为例,基层采取持续性“发声”、策略性“反对”和条件性“遵从”等方式进行“软抵制”,上级则采取“借势”“打拉”“妥协”和“共情”等方式推进目标的实现。究其原因,基层治理中心的下沉和街道办事处管理职能的强化,一定程度上改变了基层治理中“条强块弱”的格局。“抵制—协商”互动模式体现了基层条块间在社会事务处理和公共服务提供中的民主协商,有利于提高基层治理效能。在今后城市基层治理体制改革中应进一步厘清基层条块关系,推动形成基层条块间共商共建、协同治理的格局。
Intergovernmental interactions have always been a focal point of academic research.However,scholars mostly focus on the“central-local”intergovernmental interactions in the vertical dimension as well as the interdepartmental interactions in the horizontal dimension,so that the research on oblique intergovernmental interactions is limited.The first author of this paper made use of the convenience of serving as head of the expert group on the decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority in District C of B City,interviewed 11 staff members from the Civil Affairs Bureau(CAB)and four sub-district offices,and attended seminars and symposiums hosted by the CAB.After getting authorization from the CAB,the authors analyzed these materials.In 2019,the District C of B City initiated a decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority,which aimed at delegating the social assistance approval authority from the CAB to sub-district offices of District C.As a result,the responsibility of the former was reduced,while the risk and workload of the latter was increased.Thus,this reform was vehemently opposed by the sub-district offices through the following ways:(1)Persistent“claiming”.The sub-district offices made use of various occasions and opportunities to express their concerns and difficulties,so as to halt or delay the reform.(2)Strategically“opposing”.The sub-district offices requested that the CAB amend certain provisions of the reform scheme,or they would withdraw from the reform pilot.(3)Conditionally“obeying”.After some of their concerns were satisfied,the sub-district offices expressed their support for the reform.In the face of the resistance from the sub-district offices,measures were taken by the CAB which included:(1)“Taking advantage of the authority from superior leaders”.A reform team was established headed by the main leaders of District C and the leaders of B City were invited to attend mobilization and deployment meetings.(2)“Irreconcilable(one plays the hero while the other plays the villain in Chinese context)”.The director of the CAB made pushing demands at formal meetings and exerted administrative and political pressures on the sub-district offices,while the deputy director held heart-to-heart conversations with them in some informal situations explaining the urgency of the reform to receive support from the sub-district offices.(3)“Compromise”.The CAB gathered opinions from sub-district offices and adopted some reasonable suggestions.(4)“Empathy”.The CAB arranged for the major leaders of the sub-district offices on an official visit to other districts to win over their understanding and recognition.In the process of decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority in District C,the interactions between sub-district offices and the CAB do not present a“command-obedience”or“competition-conflict”mode as in the traditional intergovernmental interactions.The major reason can be attributed to the urban grassroots governance mechanism reform of B City.Since 2017,B City has explored a grass-roots governance model named“sub-district offices and township governments whistle,agencies report for duty”,which endows sub-district offices with authority to command,dispatch,and evaluate its upper-level departments,and enhances their coordinating capability in urban grass-roots governance,thus power distribution between the sub-district offices and the CAB is balanced to some extent.The discourse power of the sub-district offices is enhanced during the decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority through undertaking authority from their upper-level governments and becoming the new center of grassroots social governance.Therefore,an interactive model of oblique intergovernmental interactions characterized by“resistance-negotiation”comes into being.
作者
杨立雄
雷妮妮
Yang Lixiong;Lei Nini(School of Labor and Human Resources,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;The First Aircraft Institute,AVIC,Xi’an 710089,China)
出处
《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期80-93,共14页
Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
关键词
社会救助审批权
“软权力”约束
“抵制—协商”方式
斜向府际关系
social assistance approval authority
under the constraint of“soft power”
“resistance-negotiation”interactive mode
oblique government interactions
作者简介
杨立雄(https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9382-1884),男,中国人民大学劳动人事学院社会保障系教授,博士生导师,社会学博士,主要从事贫困与社会救助、残疾人、老年人保障等研究;雷妮妮(https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8098-7970),女,航空工业第一飞院人力资源部社会保障主管,管理学硕士,主要从事社会保障、行政管理等研究。
