摘要
在法官的司法活动中,意在规避职业风险、实现自我保护的避险行为已经成为一个制度化了的非正式行为。定分止争、服务大局、审级架构、党政司互嵌以及惩罚的机制分别从组织目标、组织结构和激励机制三个维度,共同构成了避险行为的合法性基础。避险行为不能简单归因于法官的道德或者素质,它是现行司法制度中法官个人目标与法院组织目标偏离的结果,它的稳定存在和重复再生受司法组织结构和制度环境的影响,在很大程度上也是近年来司法改革制度设计,特别是放权式司法决策过程和惩罚性激励机制强化所导致的非预期结果。要减少法官司法活动中的避险行为,需要对司法现象进行深入系统的组织研究,提出有力的理论解释。
In the judicial activities of judges,it has become an institutionalized informal behavior to avoid professional risks and realize self-protection.The mechanism of dividing and stopping disputes,serving the overall situation,trial level structure,mutual embedding of party,government and department,and punishment,from three dimensions of organizational goal,organizational structure and incentive mechanism,constitute the legitimacy foundation of risk aversion.The behavior of avoiding danger can not be simply attributed to the morality or quality of the judge.It is the result of the deviation between the personal goal of the judge and the organizational goal of the court in the current judicial system.Its stable existence and repeated regeneration are the product of the judicial organizational structure and institutional environment.To a large extent,it is also the unexpected result of the judicial reform system design in recent years,especially the decentralized judicial decision-making process and the strengthening of punitive incentive mechanism.In order to reduce the risk aversion in the judicial activities of judges,it is necessary to conduct in-depth and systematic organizational research on judicial phenomena and put forward a strong theoretical explanation.
出处
《法律和政治科学》
2021年第2期71-103,共33页
Law and Political Science
基金
2021年重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究“成渝地区双城经济圈司法协同创新机制研究”项目(21SKJD014)的阶段性成果,依托“区域协调发展法治化研究协同创新团队”
关键词
司法改革
司法责任制
司法决策
法官行为
规避风险
Judicial reform
Judicial responsibility system
Judicial decision-making
Judge behavior
Risk aversion
作者简介
张瑞,法学博士,西南政法大学博士后流动站研究人员、讲师。
