摘要
国家创新能力提升依赖于创新扩散效应的理想实现,因而探讨专利制度作用下创新扩散效应如何理想实现,是一个值得研究的问题。从分析制度演化理论切入,以微观企业主体为分析视角,探讨专利制度作用下创新提供方与潜在接受方之间在实现创新扩散过程中的互动策略选择机理,运用Matlab软件仿真模拟动态演化过程发现:在专利制度的影响作用下,创新双方互动博弈最终实现系统演化均衡,但只有在双方从自身利益最大化出发均选择创新技术策略的情况下,专利制度的激励作用才得到完全发挥,创新扩散效应得到理想实现。同时,专利补贴政策正向激励创新扩散,而预期专利转让费、专利费用及转让税率对创新扩散效应产生负向影响。
The improvement of national innovation capability depends on the ideal realization of innovation diffusion effect,so it is worth studying how to realize the innovation diffusion effect under the patent system.Starting from the analysis of the theory of institutional evolution and from the perspective of micro-enterprise subjects,this study discusses the interactive strategy choice mechanism between innovation providers and potential recipients in the process of innovation diffusion under the patent system.By using Matlab software to simulate the dynamic evolution process,it is found that under the influence of the patent system,the interactive game between the two sides of the innovation finally achieves the equilibrium of the system evolution,but only when both sides choose the innovation technology strategy from the maximization of their own interests,the incentive function of the patent system can be brought into full play,and the innovation diffusion effect can be realized ideally.At the same time,the patent subsidy policy is positive to encourage innovation,while the patent transfer fee,patent fee and transfer tax rate are expected to have a negative impact on the innovation diffusion effect.
作者
赵娟
卫志民
Zhao Juan;Wei Zhimin(School of Government Management,Beijing Normal University,Beijing100875,China)
出处
《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期64-70,共7页
Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）
基金
国家社科基金重大项目“基于市场导向的创新体系中政府作用边界、机制及优化”(18ZDA114)阶段性成果
关键词
专利制度
创新扩散
演化博弈
patent system
innovation diffusion
evolutionary game
作者简介
赵娟(1980-),女,河南许昌人,副编审,北京师范大学政府管理学院博士生;卫志民(1968-),男,山西临汾人,经济学博士,北京师范大学政府管理学院教授,博士生导师。
