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供应链企业收益分配的博弈模型研究 被引量:21

Study on Game Model of Profit Distribution in Supply Chain Corporation
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摘要 根据供应链企业的特点,应用委托———代理理论,建立了基于产出分享合同形式的分配策略与团体惩罚相结合的利益分配机制;对产出分享合同形式的分配模型进行了具体的求解分析,效率较高或机会成本较低的合作伙伴应在分配中所占的份额较高;而团体惩罚机制的引入解决了“搭便车”问题。 With characteristics of supply chain corporation and agency theory the distribution strategy based on the share contract form is setup, and the profit distribution system combined with group rewards and penalties is built. By analyzing distribution model of product share contract form in detail the conclusion that the cooperation partner whose efficiency higher or opportunity cost lower should get a higher share is obtained. Meanwhile the free ride problem is solved by introducing group rewards and penalties system.
出处 《价值工程》 2004年第3期29-31,共3页 Value Engineering
关键词 供应链企业 收益分配 博弈模型 团体惩罚机制 supply chain product share contract model group penaleies system
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参考文献6

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