摘要
政府的节能减排政策以及消费者的低碳偏好给企业的生产运作带来了重要的影响。以此为背景,以单个制造商和单个零售商组成的低碳供应链为研究对象,分析了广告合作契约及广告合作-减排成本分担契约对供应链最优决策及协调性的影响,并探索了零售商考虑公平关切前后,低碳供应链最优决策及渠道协调有何变化。研究发现无论零售商是否考虑公平关切,仅采用广告合作契约均不能实现渠道协调;但当采用广告合作-减排成本分担契约时,零售商的公平关切在一定条件下可以改变契约本身的协调性,为现实生活中,当零售商考虑公平关切时,制造商应该如何设计低碳供应链合作契约提供了理论依据。
Governments' energy-saving emission reduction policies and consumers' low-carbon preference have important implications for an enterprise's production operations.Implementing processes that save energy and reduce carbon emissions always increases a company's operation costs.In response to the consumers who has low-carbon preference,companies often adopt advertising campaigns to increase product sales,which further increases the sales cost.The increase of production and sale costs bring down the market performance of supply chain.In this paper,a low-carbon supply chain channel with one manufacturer and one retailer is considered and how to optimize the low-carbon supply chain management decision is shown and the supply chain performance is improved through contract design.In this paper the co-op advertising(CA)contract and the co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing(CA-ERCS)contracts how to impact the low-carbon supply chain's optimal decision and coordination are analyzed.How the optimal decision and coordination change when a retailer has fairness concerns is also explored.There are several findings.First,regardless of whether or not the retailer has fairness concerns,a co-op advertising contract cannot achieve channel coordination,but can enhance channel effectiveness;Second,when the retailer does not have fairness concerns,the co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts can achieve channel coordination and achieve win-win situation under certain conditions;Third,the retailer's fairness concerns can change the co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts' coordination in some cases:when the retailer feels general equality,the channel can be coordinated;when the retailer feels disadvantageous inequality,the channel can be coordinated only when the marginal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer within a certain proportion;but when the retailer feels advantageous inequality,the channel cannot be coordinated.So the retailer's fairness concerns can change the contract's coordination under certain conditions.Our study contributes to the theoretical basis for the design of lowcarbon supply chain cooperation contracts,especially in cases where the retailer has fairness concerns.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第2期121-129,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71431006)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71171201
71671189
71471178
71502178)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2011RWSK003)
关键词
公平关切
低碳供应链
广告合作
广告合作-减排成本分担
fairness concerns
low-carbon supply chain
co-op advertising
co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing
