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承认与执行外国法院判决的博弈分析 被引量:12

A Game Theory Analysis on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
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摘要 博弈论对国家在判决承认与执行中的成本收益进行比较分析,通过成本收益分析指明不同国家的理性政策选择。囚徒困境博弈表明各国在判决承认与执行中会陷入相互拒绝的困境。智猪博弈表明经济大国在与小国的博弈中没有占优战略,但是双方合作能够实现利益最大化。无限次重复博弈表明从长远来看合作有利于实现双方利益最大化。合作博弈则指出有约束力的契约和利益的公平分配能保证参与人达成合作,并实现利益最大化。在我国的司法实践中存在大量拒绝承认与执行外国法院判决的案例。这种拒绝行为对我国的长远利益是无益的。结合理论分析与司法实践,我国应该与其他国家强化互惠关系、加快条约签订以推动各国在判决承认与执行上的合作。 The game theory analyzes the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by using the cost-benefit analysis.This kind of cost-benefit analysis makes clear the rational policy choice in different countries.The prisoner’s dilemma game analyzes the plight that each country refuses to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment.The boxed pigs game points out that economic powers have no dominant strategy in the game with small economics,but the bilateral cooperation can achieve the maximum benefits.The infinitely repeated game theory points out that cooperation is conducive to the maximization of the benefits of both parties in the long run.The cooperative game theory shows that the combination of a binding contract and the equitable distribution of benefits can guarantee the cooperation of the game participators and maximize the benefits.There are a lot of cases that our country refuses to recognize and enforce foreign judgments.This kind of refusal act is not good for the long-term interests of our country.The combination of theoretical analysis and judicial practice shows that our country should strengthen the reciprocal relationships and accelerate the signing of the international treaties with other countries to promote the cooperation in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
出处 《武大国际法评论》 2017年第1期34-52,共19页 Wuhan University International Law Review
基金 教育部高校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"一带一路倡议与法律合作研究"(16JJD820009)的阶段性成果之一
关键词 外国法院判决 承认与执行 博弈论 合作 foreign judgments recognition and enforcement game theory cooperation
作者简介 何其生,武汉大学国际法研究所教授,博士生导师;张霞光,武汉大学国际法研究所硕士研究生
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