摘要
本文分析双寡头两阶段动态定位定价策略,首先两个企业同时选择地址,然后进行价格竞争。市场上有两种类型的消费者,对企业提供的产品有不同的偏好,每个企业预测它对地址的选择会影响它的需求和竞争密度,给出了使企业利润最大的子博弈精练Nash均衡。
In this paper we propose the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a locationthenprice dynamic game where two firms first choose location and after that compete for prices.There are two types of consumers,each with different valuations for the products offered by the firms,and the firms anticipate that their location choice affects price competition and therefore maximizes their profit.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2003年第2期27-30,共4页
Operations Research and Management Science
