摘要
BT模式在我国基础设施特别是城市轨道交通项目中广泛应用。利用委托代理理论分析城市轨道交通BT项目的委托代理关系,基于不完全信息下的合作博弈构建最优激励报酬模型,并对模型最优解进行分析,得到各参数对激励报酬系数的作用效果。在上述基础上,提出建立报酬激励方案、参与约束与激励相容约束等相应的激励建议。
BT mode is widely used in infrastructure project especially urban rail transit project. The paper analyzes principal-agent relationship of urban rail transit BT project using the principal-agent theory,and builds a optimal incentive compensation model based on the cooperative game on incomplete information,then analyzes the optimal solution of the model to get the effects of various parameters on the incentive compensation coefficient. On the basis of above,puts forward establishing the rewood incentive scheme and other suggestions.
出处
《建筑经济》
2015年第10期30-33,共4页
Construction Economy
关键词
城市轨道交通
BT项目
委托代理
激励机制
urban rail transit
BT project
principal agent
incentive mechanism
