摘要
为了提高政企应急储备的合作效率、保障应急物资的供应能力,在基于数量柔性契约的企业代储应急物资模式下,采用Stackelberg博弈方法,针对救援物资现货价格稳定和波动两种情形,分别研究代储企业的储备决策和政府的定价决策问题,并给出不同参数情景下政企的合作条件和最优决策。在此基础上,以供应链的总收益最大化为目标,进一步分析了物资现货价格稳定和波动时的供应链集中决策和分散决策的差异,并分别设计了协调应急物资供应链的契约合同。研究结果显示,企业储备能力是影响政企代储合作的关键因素,现货价格波动时更凸显了企业储备能力和供应链协调的重要性;带回购的数量柔性契约仅能在物资现货价格稳定时协调供应链,研究构造的绩效激励契约能在物资现货价格波动时协调供应链。
This paper presents an optimization framework for government-enterprise cooperation in emergency reserves through improved supply chain coordination mechanisms,with the goal of effectively ensuring the availability of disaster relief materials.By focusing on the emergency material enterprise reserve model,the paper develops a game model of emergency reserve cooperation between government and enterprises based on quantity flexibility contracts.Employing the Stackelberg game framework,this paper first examines the reserve quantity decisions made by enterprises and the procurement pricing decisions of the government under two scenarios:stable and fluctuating spot prices for materials.By assuming that random disaster relief demand follows an increasing failure rate function,the paper derives the cooperation conditions and optimal decisions for both the government and enterprises across various parameter combinations.Subsequently,the paper further investigates optimal centralized decision-making for the emergency supply chain by maximizing overall supply chain benefits and analyzes the differences between centralized and decentralized decision-making approaches.Finally,it designs supply chain contracts that can coordinate the stability and fluctuations of material spot prices,followed by a numerical case analysis of emergency relief food package reserves for flood disasters.The results indicate that enterprise reserve capacity is a critical factor influencing government-enterprise cooperation.The government should collaborate with enterprises that have strong reserve capabilities to enhance rescue efficiency.Fluctuations in spot prices significantly raise government procurement costs,underscoring the importance of enterprise reserve capacity and effective supply chain coordination.The buy-back quantity flexibility contract effectively coordinates emergency supply chains when material spot prices are stable,whereas the performance-incentive quantity flexibility contract is more effective during fluctuations in spot prices.The government can modify revenue distribution through incentive parameters,and the performance-incentive contract can be implemented by requiring enterprises to maintain production capacity reserves.
作者
褚宏睿
王晓冉
陈寅莹
CHU Hongrui;WANG Xiaoran;CHEN Yinying(School of Management and Engineering,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China)
出处
《安全与环境学报》
北大核心
2025年第10期3976-3988,共13页
Journal of Safety and Environment
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72101165)
北京市教育委员会科技/社科计划项目(SM202210038002)。
关键词
公共安全
应急物资储备
数量柔性契约
物资价格波动
供应链协调
public safety
emergency supplies reserve
quantity flexibility contract
material price fluctuation
supply chain coordination
作者简介
褚宏睿,副教授,从事应急管理、应急物流与供应链管理研究,chuhongrui@cueb.edu.cn。
