摘要
聚焦由国际货运代理企业和中欧班列运营商构成的中欧班列物流服务供应链,为探讨双方运营努力成本信息对称与否对其决策及整体供应链绩效的影响。首先,构建双方均不谎报运营努力成本信息、双方分别单方谎报运营努力成本信息3种情形下以中欧班列运营商为主导的分散决策模型,并利用逆向归纳法对其求解;其次,构建物流服务供应链集中决策模型,将得到的最优决策和绩效与分散决策下的结果进行对比;最后,针对信息对称和信息不对称下的分散决策设计实现供应链协调的契约,并运用Mathematica软件对其进行数值仿真。研究发现,在分散决策下,国际货运代理企业会倾向于低报其运营努力成本以获取更多货源,而中欧班列运营商也会倾向于投入更多的运营努力水平以“接力”更多货运需求,此时低报成本行为对中欧班列运营商以及供应链整体最大利润的负面影响并不明显;在集中决策下,供应链中成员的最优决策和供应链整体利润均高于信息对称和不对称下的分散决策所能达到的最优水平;无论信息对称与否,“收益共享+双边努力成本共担+单边支付”的契约设计均可有效协调分散决策下的中欧班列物流服务供应链,且当单边支付满足一定条件时,供应链中成员的收益可实现帕累托改进。研究结果可为促进中欧班列物流服务供应链中成员协同合作、提升供应链整体运营效率提供理论参考。
By focusing on the China-Europe Railway Express(CRE)logistics service supply chain consisting of international freight forwarders and CRE operators,this study explored the impact of cost information symmetry,or the lack thereof,in their operations on decision-making and overall supply chain performance.First,a decentralized decision-making model dominated by the CRE operator was constructed under three circumstances:both parties disclose the operational efforts cost information,one party misreports the cost information unilaterally,and the other party misreports the cost information unilaterally.The problem was analyzed using the backward induction method.Second,a centralized decision-making model for the logistics service supply chain was constructed,and the optimal decisions and performance outcomes were compared with those under decentralized decision-making.Finally,for the decentralized decision-making under information symmetry and asymmetry,a coordination contract was designed,and numerical simulations were conducted using Mathematica software.The results show that under the decentralized decision-making,international freight forwarders tend to understate their operating effort costs to obtain more cargo sources,and CRE operators also tend to invest more operational efforts to“relay”more freight demand.The negative impact of underreporting cost behavior on the maximum profit of CRE operators and the overall supply chain is not obvious.Under centralized decision making,the optimal decision-making of members in the supply chain and the overall profit of the supply chain are higher than those that can be achieved by decentralized decision-making under information symmetry and asymmetry.Regardless of information symmetry or not,the contract design of“revenue sharing+bilateral effort cost sharing+unilateral payment”can effectively coordinate the CRE logistics service supply chain under decentralized decision-making.When the unilateral payment satisfies certain conditions,the benefits of members in the supply chain can be Pareto-improved.The results of this study can provide a theoretical reference for promoting the cooperation of members in the CRE logistics service supply chain and improving the overall operational efficiency of the supply chain.
作者
张晶蓉
谷东红
李梦丽
霍冉
王正阳
ZHANG Jingrong;GU Donghong;LI Mengli;HUO Ran;WANG Zhengyang(School of Management,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处
《铁道科学与工程学报》
北大核心
2025年第8期3459-3470,共12页
Journal of Railway Science and Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(72101041)
河南省高校哲学社科基础研究重大项目(2024-JCZD-20)
河南省重点软科学项目(242400411138)。
作者简介
通信作者:李梦丽(1993-),女,河南禹州人,讲师,博士,从事平台经济、物流与供应链管理研究,E−mail:limengli@zzu.edu.cn。
