债权人保护与大股东掏空行为——基于破产法庭设立的研究证据

Creditor Protection and Large Shareholders'Tunneling Behavior Empirical Evidence Based on the Establishment of Bankruptcy Courts

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摘要债权人监督缺位加剧了企业机会主义倾向,而健全的破产制度是保护债权人权益、强化债权人监督治理地位的重要举措,可能成为有效抑制大股东掏空行为的创新突破。本文利用我国各地设立破产法庭作为准自然实验,选取2011-2023年上市公司样本,构建PSM-DID模型,实证考察破产法庭设立对大股东掏空行为的影响。检验结果证实破产法庭设立能够抑制大股东掏空行为;破产法庭设立通过提高信息披露质量和优化营商环境,降低代理成本,抑制大股东掏空行为;异质性检验表明,破产法庭设立对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用在法律环境好、产品市场发育程度高、破产风险高的样本中更加显著。因此,应进一步完善破产法庭体系与制度建设,构建多层级、立体化的合规管理体系,提升企业信息披露质量,因地制宜实施差别化对策,从而有效保护债权人权益,抑制大股东掏空行为。 The absence of creditor supervision exacerbates firms'opportunistic tendencies,while a sound bankruptcy system,as an important measure to protect creditors'rights and interests and strengthen their supervisory and governance role,may become an innovative breakthrough in effectively curbing tunneling by major shareholders.This paper uses the establishment of bankruptcy courts across China as a quasinatural experiment,selects samples of listed companies from 2011 to 2023,and constructs a PSM-DID model to empirically examine the impact of the establishment of bankruptcy courts on tunneling by major shareholders.The test results confirm that the establishment of bankruptcy courts can curb tunneling by major shareholders.Specifically,the establishment of bankruptcy courts reduces agency costs by improving the quality of information disclosure and optimizing the business environment,thereby curbing such tunneling behavior.Heterogeneity tests show that the inhibitory effect of the establishment of bankruptcy courts on tunneling by major shareholders is more significant in samples with a sound legal environment,highly developed product markets,and high bankruptcy risk.Therefore,it is necessary to further improve the system and institutional construction of bankruptcy courts,establish a multi-level and three-dimensional compliance management system,enhance the quality of corporate information disclosure,and implement differentiated strategies based on local conditions.In this way,we can effectively protect creditors'rights and interests and curb tunneling by major shareholders.

作者强国令龚欣妍 Qiang Guoling;Gong Xinyan(School of Finance,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi 830012,China;Centre for Collaborative Research in Public Finance and Finance,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi 830012,China)

机构地区新疆财经大学金融学院新疆财经大学财政金融协同研究中心

出处《金融理论探索》 2025年第4期57-68,共12页 Exploration of Financial Theory

基金新疆维吾尔自治区社会科学基金项目“乡村振兴背景下南疆四地州农村基本公共服务水平提升路径研究”(2024BYJ050) 新疆维吾尔自治区普通高等学校人文社会科学基地财政金融协同创新中心基金项目“共同富裕视域下对口援疆对新疆居民收入的影响与政策研究”(XJEDU2024J089)。

关键词破产法庭大股东掏空行为债权人保护公司治理 bankruptcy courts tunneling by controlling shareholders creditor protection corporate governance

分类号 F832.0 [经济管理—金融学]

作者简介强国令,博士,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为公司金融;龚欣妍,研究方向为公司金融。