董事会断裂带与审计师选择

Board Faultlines and Auditor Choice

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摘要《公司法》规定董事会有权选择会计师事务所。而董事会断裂带的存在一方面可能增加董事会成员之间的差异性,削弱董事会的监督意愿和监督能力,促使公司选择低质量的审计师;另一方面,董事会断裂带对“裙带关系”的抑制作用可能会提高董事会的监督能力,使得公司选择高质量的审计师。以2008—2023年的沪深A股上市公司作为样本,实证研究上市公司董事会断裂带如何影响审计师选择以及其影响机制。研究结果表明:董事会断裂带的存在限制了上市公司选择高质量的审计师;股权制衡机制通过绑定管理层与股东利益,能够显著降低董事会断裂带对上市公司选择高质量审计师的抑制效应。进一步研究发现,国有上市公司中董事会断裂带的存在使其更可能选择低质量的审计师。因此,上市公司应优化董事会成员结构,降低断裂带强度与距离,并通过多元化激励机制促进公司选聘高质量审计师。 The Company Law stipulates that the board of directors holds the authority to appoint accounting firms.The ex-istence of board faultlines may,on one hand,amplify differences among board members,weaken their supervisory willingness and capability,and incentivize companies to opt for lower-quality auditors.On the other hand,it may also suppress cronyism,enhance the board's oversight capacity,and thereby encourage the selection of high-quality auditors.Using a sample of Ashare listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2023,this study empirically examines how board faultlines influence auditor selection and the underlying mechanisms.The findings reveal that board faultlines constrain companies from choosing high-quality auditors.Equity restriction mechanisms,by aligning the interests of management and shareholders,sig-nificantly mitigate the inhibitory effect of board faultlines on high-quality auditor selection.Further analysis indicates that state-owned enterprises with board faultlines are more inclined to select low-quality auditors.Consequently,companies should optimize board composition to reduce faultline intensity and distance,while employing diversified incentive mechanisms to pro-mote the selection of high-quality auditors.

作者吴先聪杨皓雪陈萌 Xiancong Wu;Haoxue Yang;Meng Chen(Business School,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China;Shinewing Certified Public Accountants(Special General Partnership)Chongqing Branch,Chongqing 401120,China)

机构地区西南政法大学商学院信永中和会计师事务所重庆分所

出处《财务与金融》 2025年第2期25-40,共16页 Accounting and Finance

基金重庆市社会科学规划项目(2021NDYB067)阶段成果重庆市教委人文社科项目(25SKGH010)。

关键词董事会断裂带审计师选择股权制衡企业性质 Board Faultlines Auditor Choice Executive Incentive Nature of Ownership

分类号 F239 [经济管理—会计学]

作者简介吴先聪,女,博士,西南政法大学教授,主要研究方向:公司治理、会计与审计,E-mail:christiewu@126.com,Tel:15310971813;杨皓雪,本科,西南政法大学,在读硕士,主要研究方向:公司治理、审计;陈萌,硕士,信永中和会计师事务所合伙人,高级审计师,研究方向:审计。